) is decidable. The algorithm is based on reduction of formulas to inference rules and converting the rules in special reduced normal form, and, then, on checking validity of such rules in models of singleexponential size in the rules. Also we consider the admissibility problem for TL(N 
Introduction
Modal-type logics play an important role in various disciplines ranging from philosophy, through foundations of mathematics to applications in AI and CS. They provide excellent formalisms for studying the semantics of computation via graphs, e.g. transition systems, parse trees, Petri nets, decision diagrams, and flow charts. Most members of the AI community agree that logic has an important role to play in the central areas of AI research. This, in particular, follows from logical tools for deriving new knowledge (from known/accepted facts), which are based on logical consequence relation. Logical consequence, arguably the most fundamental concept in logic, is the relation that holds between a set of sentences (or propositions) and a sentence (proposition) when the latter follows from the former. Technique of non-classical logic (modal, multi-modal, temporal ones) has been involved to cover various aspects of problems for computerized modeling of intelligent behavior. Major applications to AI and CS was focused to reasoning about knowledge, time and computation (cf., for instance, Goldblatt [10, 11] , van Benthem [31, 32] , Gabbay, Hodkinson and Reynolds [5] , Gabbay, Hodkinson [6] ). Semantic tools for modal and temporal logics are often based on special sort of Kripke/Hinttikka models (special graphs), modal and temporal algebras (cf. Goldblatt [10, 11] ).
It is relevant to say, that modal-like logics with linear alternative accessibility relations, linear temporal logics, were studied in details (and deserve it as most natural interpretation of the time flow). Say, Bull [2, 3] and Segerberg [30] found finite axiomatizations for many such logics, proved fmp (finite model property) (and hence decidability) for some these logics. Though [2] shows that temporal logic L Z of integers with strict order does not have fmp. The decidability of L Z , first, it seems, was proved by D.Gabbay basing at Rabin's results of monadic 2nd order theories of successor functions (perhaps the decidability also followed from earlier research of D.Scott using automata). Litak and Wolter [19] showed that all finitely axiomatizable tense logics of linear time flows are decidable: coNPcomplete.
We are interested to extend the language of linear temporal logics by operations imitating possibility of discovery in time flow. The logic of discovery has a solid prehistory, maybe, starting from the monograph Logic of Discovery and Logic of Discourse by Jaakko Hintikka and Fernand Vandamme [18] . This logic has evident interdisciplinary direction and is influenced by various ideas coming from researchers with distinct background.
One more direction merging pure proof theory and semantics is discovering admissible inference rules originated by Lorenzen [20] . Initially only particular interesting examples of admissible but not derivable rules were observed (cf. Harrop [14] , Mints [21] ). An affirmative solution for H.Friedman problem (1975) on existing an algorithm for solving admissibility problem for intuitionistic logic IPC was found in Rybakov [23] . Then S. Ghilardi [7] gave a solution of this problem via projective formulas, while P. Rozire [22] discovered the solution within proof theory. The area of study admissible inference rules was developed in a solid branch in non-classical logics (cf. Ghilardi [8, 9] , Iemhoff [15] , Jerábek [16] , Rybakov [24] - [29] ).
Next interest to our research came from the easy observation that linear temporal logics possess the definable universal modality. The universal modality, first was investigated in Goranko and Passy [13] . In study of hybrid logics, universal modality nowadays is one of standard constructors, cf. Acrces, Blackburn, Marx [1] . The idea to employ definable universal modalities for admissibility problem was looking rather attractive.
We address all this questions in this our paper, we study the logic TL(N 
C
) are Kripke/ Hintikka models generated by linear discrete time with time points being a clusters of states-uncertain situations. To study the properties of reasoning/computation modeled by these structures we introduce modal(temporal) like language including modalities 3 + (possible in future) and 3 − (possible in past) and else special temporal operations-weak necessities directed to future and past: 2 + w (weakly necessary in future) and 2 − w (weakly necessary in past). We discuss the language and rules for computing truth values of formulas of the suggested language in specified Kripke/Hintikka models, define formally the logic TL(N 
) is decidable) based on reduction of formulas to rules and converting rules in special reduced normal form, and, then, on checking validity of such rules in models of single-exponential size in the rules. The technique which we use is borrowed from our research (cf. [23] - [29] ) devoted to study inference rules in non-classical logics. At the second part of the paper, we show how to reduce in TL(N ) has interesting new properties which been not considered yet in contemporary literature, and which are problematic to express by standard modal or temporal languages. The paper uses standard terminology and known facts about modal and temporal logic, though we supply the reader all necessary definitions and known facts to follow the paper.
Notation, Preliminaries
This paper explores special expansions of linear temporal logics; in general, temporal logics (in standard language) are, in own turn, special cases of bi-modal logics. Therefore we proceed by recalling definitions and notation concerning multi-modal logics. The language of multi-modal logics consists of the language of Boolean logic extended by new unary logical modal operations 2 i . Basically only finite amount of modal operations, -n -, of 2 i , are used, then the introduced logics are called n-modal logic. Formation rules for formulas are standard.
A Kripke/Hintikka frame is a tuple F := F, R 1 , . . . , R n , where F is the base of F -a non-empty set, and all R i are binary (accessibility) relations on F . |F| := F , a ∈ F is denotation for a ∈ |F|. If, for a set of propositional letters P , a valuation V of P in |F| is defined, i.e. V : P → 2 F , ∀p ∈ P : V (p) ⊆ F , we call M := F, V Kripke/Hintikka model (structure). The truth values of formulas are defined at elements of F by the following rules:
Definition 2. For a class K of frames, the logic L(K) generated by K is the set of all formulas which are true in all models based on frames from K.
For instance, for the basic minimal normal modal logic K, K = L(K fr ), where K fr is the set of all frames with single accessibility relation, for Lewis modal logic S4, S4 := L(K rt ), where K rt is the set of all frames with single reflexive and transitive accessibility relation. We can take in the definitions above only finite frames, i.e. K and S4 have so called finite model property (fmp). A semantic definition for temporal logics can be given based at special 2-modal logics. Consider a set K of all 2-frames of structure F, R, R −1 , and the language with two modal operations 2 + -for R, and 2 − -for R −1 . The logic L(K) of K in this language is the temporal logic of K. Operations 3 + and 3 − are derivatives of 2 + and 2 − , as usual in modal logic. All Kripkecomplete temporal logics can be generated this way. For any logic
Linear Kripke complete temporal logics L(K) are based on classes K of frames with linear accessibility relation R imitating time flaw. In this approach, any time point is just a state where propositions coded by formulas may be evaluated (computed).
We would like to extend this interpretation, looking at a time point as a model of current states in the given time point. What are these states? Maybe, the set of all human beings with their own knowledge and viewpoints, maybe the set of all Internet WEB sites and the set of all libraries and other information nodes available in a given time point, etc. So, based on this general idea, the semantics we consider are Kripke/Hintikka models based on linear graphs with circles described below. The frame is a graph N C := i∈N C(i), R , where N is the set of all natural numbers, each i ∈ N (any natural number i) is the time index for possible current events from now to future.
Any C(i) is a finite set of all possible states in the time point i. In our formalism, any C(i) is simply a set of elements (worlds in terms of Kripke/Hintikka semantics).
The time flow (say, imitating a computational process, an evolving of a system, a discovery search, a verification, just time flow from physical/philosophical viewpoint) is modeled by the binary accessibility relation R in the frame N C := i∈N C(i), R , where for all elements a and b from i∈N C(i), aRb ⇐⇒ a ∈ C(i) and b ∈ C(j) and i j .
R imitates the discrete flow of time connecting states in time, so, aRb means that a and b are some states at the same time point or the state b may be achieved after the time point where the state a will be accomplished. So, the flow of the time is supposed to be linear, which matches well with daily human experience. To reason about properties of the truth for statements in these frames, we introduce the following modal-like language Take a set P of propositional letters (to code facts, propositions, which may or may not happen, may be true or not true in the time flow of computation/reasoning). For each frame N C , we consider all valuations V of P , which are mappings of P into the set of all subsets of the set i∈N C(i),
If, for an element a ∈ i∈N C(i), if a ∈ V (p) we say the fact p holds in the state a. For example, consider the frame N C := i∈N [2i, 2i + 1], R , with the valuation V of the letter p, where V (p) := {2i | i ∈ N }. Then the fact p holds (is true) in a state of any cluster [2i, 2i + 1]. This follows from the fact that any cluster [2i, 2i + 1] consists of an even number 2i, where p is true, and followed by the odd number 2i + 1. Let the frame N C above to model the parallel computing, where at each computational step i we achieve exactly two states 2i and 2i+ 1 (numeration of which is not essential), but 2i always is the state, where the property p-to have consistent outputs-holds. Then the frame N C models the special parallel computing, where, at each computational step, at least one state with consistent outputs is discoverable. To construct formulas, we use all Boolean logical operations: ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬ (not), → (implease), and extend them by the modal operations 3 + (possible in future), 3 − (possible in past), 2 + w (weak necessary in future) and 2 − w (weak necessary in past). The formation rules for formulas (wffs) are the standard ones:
(i) Any propositional letter from P is a well formed formula (wff).
(ii) If ϕ and ψ are wffs then ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ → ψ and ¬ϕ are also wffs.
(iii) If ϕ is a wff then , 3 + ϕ, 3 − ϕ, 2 + ϕ and 2 − ϕ are also wffs.
The rules for computing of truth values for formulas in models N C with valuations V of propositions P are as follows. In the notation below (N C , a) V ϕ is meant to say the formula ϕ in true at the state a in the model
Steps for Boolean operations are standard, as described above for multimodal logics. The steps for 3 + and 3 − are also standard, as temporal operation for future and past:
But we interpret 2 + w and 2 − w as not in standard modal or temporal operations:
So, computation of the operations 2 + w and 2 − w are nonstandard. 2 + w ϕ says that ϕ is weakly necessary in future -in any time cluster in future, there is a state where ϕ holds, while the dual one -2 − w ϕ says that ϕ is weakly necessary in past -for any time cluster in past, there is a state where ϕ is true. Thus, we suggest a thinner treatment of the operation 2 as a variant of week necessity. This specification of 2 w makes the logic we offer to be different from all standard temporal or modal logic-being a non-classical temporal logic. We enumerate below some standard modal laws which being referred to
The proof is easy computation. So, 2 + w -fragment of TL(N 
Expressive power of TL(N
) is visible when we combine both modalities 2 • w and 3 • in formulas, the language became to be much more flexible and expressible. For instance, the truth of formula 3 + 2 + w ϕ in a frame N C w.r.t a valuation (labeling) V means that a time point i is possible, where, since i in any time cluster the property ϕ is discoverable. The truth of the formula 2 + w p ∧ 2 + w ¬p → ¬3 + q would mean that if, in any time point, both p and ¬p are discoverable then in any length of time flow (a computation) q cannot be discovered. All such properties are difficult to be expressed in the standard interpretation of modal or temporal language.
We will study properties of TL(N Definition 6. A logic L is said to be decidable if there is an algorithms, which, for any formula ϕ, answer whether ϕ ∈ L (i.e. whether ϕ is a theorem of L).
The problem of decidability is one of basic problems for any logic. For instance, the satisfiability problem may be reduced to decidability. Indeed, a formula ϕ is satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is not a theorem. We address the decidability problem to TL(N 
Results, Decidability
The prime question we are dealing with in this section is how, for any given formula ϕ, to determine whether ϕ is a theorem of TL(N ) is an expansion of bimodal logic, and we can borrow some evolved technique to approach this task. Several ways are possible and we apply a technique based on our own approach tested for several logics (cf. [23] - [29] ). This approach uses a representation of formulas by rules, and converting rules in a special normal reduced form. Recall, a (sequential) rule is an expression
where ϕ 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ), . . . , ϕ m (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) are some formulas constructed out of letters x 1 , . . . , x n . Letters x 1 , . . . , x n are called variables of r, and are denoted by Var(r). A formula ϕ is valid in a frame N C (notation: N C ϕ) if, for any valuation V of Var(ϕ) and, for any element
Definition 7. A rule r is said to be valid in the Kripke model N C , V with the valuation V (we will use notation N C V r) if
Otherwise we say r is refuted in N C , or refuted in N C by V , and write N C V r. 
A rule r is valid in a frame
and x s are certain letters (variables), t(j, i, z) ∈ {0, 1} and, for any formula α above, α 0 := α, α 1 := ¬α. For any formula ϕ we can convert it in the rule x → x/ϕ and employ technique of reduced normal forms as follows.
Definition 8. Given a rule r nf in the reduced normal form, r nf is said to be a normal reduced form for a rule r iff, for any frame N C , N C r ⇐⇒ N C r nf .
Based on proofs of Lemma 3.1.3 and Theorem 3.1.11 from [24] directed to modal inference rules, by similar technique, we can obtain Theorem 9. There exists an algorithm running in (single) exponential time, which, for any given rule r, constructs its normal reduced form r nf .
Proof. We just sketch the proof below because the construction is simple. Given a rule r = ϕ 1 (x 1 , ..., x n ) , ..., ϕ m (x 1 , ..., x n )/ψ(x 1 , ..., x n ). r is equivalent to
where x c is a new variable. Therefore we can restrict the case by consideration only rules in the form c = ϕ(x 1 , . .., x n )/x c .
If ϕ = α•β, where • is a binary logical operation and both formulas α and β are not simply variables or unary logical operations applied to variables (which both we call final formulas), take two new variables x α and x β and the rule
If one from formulas α or β is final and another one not, we apply this transformation to only non-final formula. It is clear that r and r 1 are equivalent w.r.t. validity in frames.
If ϕ = * α, where * is a unary logical operation and α is not a variable, take a new variable x α and the rule r 1 := * x α ∧ x α ≡ α/x c . Again r and r 1 are equivalent.
We continue this (similar) transformation over the resulting rules
until all formulas α i and γ j in the premise of the resulting rules will be either atomic formulas-logical operations applied to variables-or variables. Evidently this transformation is polynomial. Next, we transform the premise of the resulting rule in the disjunctive normal form and make disjunctive normal form to be perfect (having the disjunctive members to be uniform length and containing all the components required in the definition of reduced normal forms) and obtain as the result an equivalent consecution r 2 . This transformation, as well as all known ones for reduction Boolean formulas to disjunctive normal forms, is exponential. But then r has the required form. ⊣
To discuss this transformation more, in (Rybakov [24] ), as an immediate consequence of the reduction of modal rules to normal forms (as above), it was shown (Corollary 3.1.27) that any normal modal logic extending K4 can be axiomatized by formulas of modal degree at most 2 (known result, Zakharyaschev, 1992). It can be done with impressive ease. Take a modal formula α, its validity is equivalent to the validity of the rule r := ⊤/α. Take its reduced normal form rf (r) = β/x 1 . For any rule r 1 = γ/δ, its transformation to the semi-universal formula f (r 1 ) is the formula 2γ ∧ γ → δ. And, for any modal logic L over K4, L⊕α = L⊕f (rf (r)), so all works. In the case of temporal logics, using the transformation of rules to the reduced normal forms described above, we can obtain a similar result: any temporal logic (it is unimportant transitive or not) enriched with the universal modality can be axiomatized by formulas of modal/temporal degree at most 2. The same holds for simply temporal logics where 2 + and 2 − are K4-modalities.
It is immediate to see that a formula ϕ is valid in a frame N C iff the rule x → x/ϕ is valid in N C , so from Theorem 9 we obtain Lemma 10. A formula ϕ is a theorem of TL(N ) it is sufficient to find an algorithm recognizing rules in reduced normal form which are valid in all frames N C . To describe our algorithm we need the following special finite Kripke models. Take any frame N C and some numbers n, m, where m > n > 1. The frame N C (n, m) has the following structure:
where R is the accessibility relation from N C extended by pairs (x, y), where x ∈ C(j 1 ), y ∈ C(j 2 ) and j 1 , j 2 ∈ [n, m], so xRy holds for all such pairs. If given a valuation V of letters from a formula ϕ in N C (n, m), the truth values of ϕ can be defined at elements of N C (n, m) by the same rules as for frames N C above (simply in accordance with standard computing of truth values for modal/temporal operations). Just in case, we describe below steps for operations 3 + , 2 + w , 3 − and 2 − w :
Notice that the interpretations for 2 + w and 2 − w are not mutually dual. Using this modified Kripke structures N C (n, m) we derive Lemma 11. A rule r nf in the reduced normal form is refuted in a frame N C w.r.t. a valuation V if and only if r nf is refuted in a frame N C (n, m) by a valuation V 1 , where
• The size of any cluster C(i) in N C (n, m) is linear in r nf .
• n and m are single-exponential in r nf .
• For any C(i) ⊂ N C (n, m) with i n, there is a C(j) ⊂ N C (n, m) with j < n such that C(j) and C(i) are isomorphic as models w.r.t. the valuation V 1 . 
This reducing the number of worlds in clusters evidently does not change the truth values of formulas from D(r nf ), so the resulting model will also invalidate r nf by V . So, we can admit that the size of clusters in N C is linear in r nf . In the sequel we consider any cluster C(i) as the Kripke model with the induced valuation V . In the sequel we will write C(i) = C(j) if C(i) and C(j) are isomorphic as models. By our rarefication, the set of all such C(i) (as Kripke models w.r.t. V ) is at most exponential in r nf .
By N C V r nf it follows (N C , a 0 ) V ¬x 1 for a 0 ∈ C(i 0 ) and some i 0 , fix a such minimal i 0 . Consider minimal number k 0 > i 0 such that
Recall we consider here and in what follows all C(j) as Kripke models w.r.t. V . Take minimal number i max > k 0 + 1, where
Next, we take the minimal number i min
For any C(i) ∈ {C(j) | j i min max } choose the minimal j C(i) > i min max + 1 where C(j C(i) ) = C(i). Among all such j C(i) choose the maximal, one -j 0 .
Let n := i min max and m := j 0 + 1. Consider the model N C (n, m) obtained from N C as described above with the induced from N C valuation V .
To continue the proof we need the following lemma:
Proof. It follows by simple conventional computation using (2), (3) and the choice of j 0 , and therefore detailed proof is left to the reader. ⊣ Numbers n and m are not bounded yet. But we can reduce the number of clusters above C(n) as follows.
where R and V are transferred from N C (n, m).
Proof. follows from Lemma 12 and the choice of clusters C(i 1 ) above by simple computation and is left to the reader. ⊣
Note that the number of clusters C(i 1 ) is at most exponential in r nf . So, we can assume that r nf is invalidated by a valuation V in a model N C (n, m) with clusters C(i) linear in r nf and where m − n is at most exponential in r nf . It only remains to bound n. For this, for any C(i) where i n − 1, consider the set
Modify now our model N C (n, m) with the valuation V as follows:
where R and V are transferred from N C (n, m). For any a ∈ N C (n, m, 1), (N C (n, m, 1), a) V D N C (a) . N (n, m) .
Proof. follows from (iii) in Lemma 11 by standard routine verification.
Therefore N C refutes the rule r nf as well as N C (n, m) does. This concludes the proof of Lemma 11. ⊣ Combining Theorem 9 and lemmas 10 and 11 we derive
) is decidable. The algorithm of verification formulas to be a theorems consists of verification validity of rules in reduced normal form in Kripke frames of single-exponential size in the rules.
The overall complexity of the algorithm includes as well the reduction of rules to normal reduced forms, but this complexity is single exponential (the same as the complexity of reduction any Boolean formula to the disjunctive normal form). This theorem is a departure point for study admissible in TL(N 
Thus, for any admissible rule, any instance into the premises converting all of them into theorems of L also turns the conclusion to be a theorem. For instance, the Lemmon-Scott rule
is admissible but not derivable in standard Hilbert-style axiomatizations for modal logics S4, S4.1 and Grz (cf. [24] ). We need one more useful notion from multi-modal logics to develop our technique. For any frame F := F, R 1 , . . . , R n with n accessibility relations, and any w ∈ F , the frame F(w) s strongly generated by w in F is the set of all a ∈ F, were a = w or
We say a class of frames K admits an universal formula if there is a formula 2 u (x) (called universal formula) constructed from a single letter x and logical operations, such that the following holds. For any F ∈ K, any world w ∈ F and any valuation V , (F, w) V Proof. This is trivial. Indeed, if ε : x i → ψ i is a unifier for ϕ in L, then for the substitution ε 1 : p j → ⊤, the composition ε 1 ε is again a unifier for ϕ. Since ¬2 i ⊥ ∈ L, ε 1 ψ i ≡ ⊤ ∈ L or ε 1 ψ i ≡ ⊥ ∈ L. So, it is sufficient to check as unifiers for ϕ only substitutions in {⊤, ⊥}. Computation of values of such substitutions is polynomial, again since ¬2 i ⊥ ∈ L. Thus, overall complexity is the same as satisfiability in PC, i.e. the tack is NP-complete. 
